This article investigates the consequence of the choice process for mental resources and the desire to obtain the selected products. We draw a distinction between instrumental choice, which serves preexisting consumption goals, and experiential choice, which serves as its own end. In four studies, we find that instrumental choice undermines mental resources and experiential choice increases these resources. As a result, although experiential choice is made with no consumption goal in mind, compared with instrumental choice, it increases the desire to obtain the selected product. We demonstrate these effects in choice among a variety of consumer products (e.g., vacation packages, novels, and flower bouquets).
characterizes choices among hypothetical outcomes, which can be no less engaging than real ones-for example, when a person chooses the movie star from whom she would like to get a kiss (Loewenstein 1987) . What characterizes these choices is the absence of an external need the choice satisfies. As a result, the choice is an end in itself and the person making the choice is less concerned with obtaining the selected option than with simply expressing her desires or taste.
This article addresses these different choice modes: the one that satisfies an external need versus the one in which the choice is the end. We distinguish between two possible benefits of choosing: external benefits, which include the utility from the product choosers receive, and internal benefits, which include the utility from the act of choosing. When the act of choosing is mainly a means to obtain some product, we label it "instrumental." When the act of choosing is mainly itself the goal, we label it "experiential" since the main purpose is to experience choosing.
We examine the consequences of instrumental versus experiential choices on people's mental resources, and the likelihood they will act on their choice by purchasing the selected products.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We position our theorizing in the conceptualization of the structure of action. Research on Choice and Instrumentality 4 motivation distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic actions (Deci and Ryan 1985; Sansone and Harackiewicz 1996; Shah and Kruglanski 2000) . Extrinsic actions serve as a means to an end, whereas intrinsic actions serve as their own end. That is, people engage in extrinsic actions to achieve external goals, whereas they engage in intrinsic actions for the reward of engagement.
Previous research finds that introducing external incentives for pursuing an activity reduces the intrinsic value of that activity. Then, because the status of the activity changed, once the incentives are removed, the likelihood of pursuing this activity is lower than before they were introduced (Kruglanski, Friedman, and Zeevi 1971; Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973) .
In line with motivation theory, the act of choosing can either be extrinsically or intrinsically motivated. When individuals have an external purchase goal, the act of choosing is extrinsically motivating. However, when they wish to express their preference or taste, their choice is intrinsically motivating; that is, it is its own goal. For example, utilitarian versus hedonic shoppers often differ by their motivation to choose products (Babin, Darden, and Griffin 1994; Botti and McGill 2010; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000) . Utilitarian shoppers obtain value from getting products they need, whereas hedonic shoppers obtain value through choosing and are less concerned with getting the products than with expressing their personal taste (Hirschman and Holbrook 1982) . Also in congruence with motivation theory, these two choice modes are not mutually exclusive; however, the more emphasis a chooser puts on the goal of choosing, the more instrumental a choice is and the less experiential it becomes.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHOICE
The motivation to perform an action-extrinsic versus intrinsic-influences people's experience during and after pursuing the action. Extrinsically motivating actions are associated Choice and Instrumentality 5 with more negative, chore-like experiences. In contrast, intrinsically motivating actions are associated with more positive experiences of goal attainment (Fishbach, Shah, and Kruglanski 2004; Higgins and Trope 1990) . Often the experience of the same action differs depending on the extrinsic versus intrinsic representation of that action. For example, studying for an exam is an effortful experience, whereas reading the same course materials for the sake of expanding one's knowledge (a goal that co-occurs with the reading activity and is not external to it) is an enjoyable experience.
We draw a similar prediction for the experience of choice and expect the consequences of instrumental choices to differ from those of experiential choices. Instrumental choices are extrinsically motivating and therefore should be effortful and resource consuming. In support of this notion, a growing body of literature shows choosing is difficult, paralyzing, and debilitating (Chernev 2003; Luce, Bettman, and Payne 1997; Simonson 1992) . Part of the difficulty stems from choice requiring a cognitively complex process that involves many weighing options (Amir and Ariely 2007) . But even simple choices (e.g., items from a menu) often involve painful tradeoffs that can be emotionally taxing. Because of the emotional toll, people often defer making a choice beyond what is necessary (Dhar 1997; Iyengar and Lepper 2000) .
Consequently, instrumental choices deplete mental resources by drawing on the same pool as other effortful mental operations, such as exercising self-control (Baumeister et al. 2008, Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister 2003) . These mental resources increase the ability or willingness to exert effort, and thus they are useful for various mental self-regulatory functions.
Because resources are limited, any activity requiring executive function (e.g., choosing) reduces the available resources, resulting in poorer performance on the subsequent activity (Baumeister 2002; Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister 1998) . In particular, choice depletion is likely when Choice and Instrumentality 6 choosing is conscious and deliberate ) and includes difficult trade-offs (Wang et al. 2010) .
In contrast to instrumental choices, experiential choices are intrinsically motivating and therefore can be pleasant to make. Indeed, other choice research identifies the act of choosing as an expression of one's sense of control (Taylor 1989) and selfhood (Deci and Ryan 1985) . In western culture, freedom of choice is considered a basic human right and an expression of a person's free will (Savani, Markus, and Conner 2008; Stephens, Markus, and Townsend 2007) .
By choosing, people express their unique tastes, desires, and goals, and their stated preferences define them not only as consumers but as autonomous human beings. Notably, in this experiential choice mode, the act of choosing matters because choosing is itself the goal.
Whereas instrumental choices are difficult and depleting, research has not yet explored the consequences of experiential choices for mental resources. We predict experiential choices will have the opposite effect of instrumental choices; that is, choices made only for the sake of expressing one's preference increase mental resources. We base our prediction on research indicating that when someone engages in an action for its own end, the act evokes a positive experience of resourcefulness (Shah 2005; Muraven, Shmueli, and Burkley 2006) and enhances subjective vitality and energy (Nix et al. 1999; Ryan and Deci 2008; Ryan and Frederick 1997) .
Indeed, Moller, Deci, and Ryan (2006) found that participants felt making autonomous (free) choices was less depleting than being advised to choose a particular item (forced choice).
Whereas their research compared forced and free choices, we compare two modes of free choice-experiential versus instrumental-and predict that experiential choices increase mental resources.
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Acting on a Choice: Interest in the Selected Item
We predict instrumental choices decrease mental resources, whereas experiential choices increase these resources. These effects in turn have implications on the likelihood that people will act on their choices, for example, that a consumer will decide to purchase a chosen item.
We expect experiential choices to increase the interest in obtaining the selected options compared with depleting instrumental choices, because some of the positive experience from the experiential choice process transfers to the selected product, thereby increasing its favorability (Fishbach et al. 2004) . Similarly, some of the depleting experience from the instrumental choice process is associated with the selected product and decreases the appeal of that product. Thus, holding the objective need for the product constant, experiential choice will increase the interest in obtaining the selected product more than instrumental choice. For example, shoppers without specific goals will find their selected items more appealing than shoppers who hold a list of their needs. This effect can be ironic when an emphasis on why consumer should get some products ends up decreasing the likelihood of acting on (i.e., purchasing) a particular choice of items.
Present Research
In four studies, we investigate how choice mode influences mental resources and interest in the selected products. We define mental resources as a sustained willingness to exert effort and measure those resources by performance on effortful tasks and self-reported feelings of energy.
These resources have a clear motivational component: individuals are more motivated to engage in effortful tasks. These resources might also have physiological components (e.g., changes in level of glucose increase the ability to exert effort); however, we do not test for those (see Tice et al. 2007 , for a similar treatment of resources). We predict instrumental choices decrease whereas experiential choices increase mental resources. As a result of these differences in the experience Choice and Instrumentality 8 of choice, experiential (vs. instrumental) choice mode increases interest in obtaining the selected product.
We operationalize instrumental versus experiential choice based on whether individuals hold a consumption goal that is external to the choice process; that is, some of the benefits of choosing are delivered at a later point in time. Specifically, study 1 manipulates choice mode by asking participants to choose for the sake of choosing (experiential) versus in order to prepare for an upcoming vacation (instrumental). Study 2 manipulates choice mode by asking participants to choose what they like most (experiential) versus what they would like to buy (instrumental). In study 3, we operationalize choice mode by asking participants to consider the means of choosing (experiential) versus the goal of choosing (instrumental). Finally, in study 4, participants choose an item after considering reasons they want (experiential) versus need (instrumental) the item.
STUDY 1: VACATION PLANNING
Planning a vacation involves making multiple choices (destination, accommodation, etc.) and often can be a chore. But planning a vacation can also be a relaxing activity in which individuals engage to express their preferences in the absence of an actual vacationing goal. Accordingly, participants in study 1 chose a vacation package either with an external goal in mind (instrumental choice) or in the absence of such a goal (experiential choice). Another group of participants evaluated the same amount of information on destinations without making choices, and we used them as a control, baseline condition for evaluating the impact of choice (e.g., Vohs et al. 2008 ).
We predict experiential choice will increase mental resources such that these individuals will perform better on a subsequent cognitive task requiring inhibition of irrelevant responses Choice and Instrumentality 9 (the "vowel-hunting task," Baumeister et al. 1998; Moller et al. 2006 ), compared with those who make an instrumental choice. In addition, we predict the experience of choice will transfer to wanting the selected item, thereby increasing participants' interest in taking their vacation when the choice mode is experiential versus instrumental.
Method
We recruited 47 students (30 females) from a large Midwestern university to participate in this study for monetary compensation. This study employed a 3 (experiential choice vs. no choice vs. instrumental choice) between-subjects design.
We invited participants to take part in a study on vacation planning. Their task was to use a travel website (expedia.com) to create a vacation package within the United States. We used an existing website to ensure the selected options were real (i.e., available for purchase).
Participants in the experiential-choice condition read, "People often plan a vacation for the sake of planning and without having any upcoming vacation in mind. . . . We are giving you an opportunity to engage in such planning activities." Participants in the instrumental-choice condition read instead, "People often make vacation plans in preparation for an upcoming vacation." The rest of the instructions were identical across these two conditions. Participants had to choose one destination within the United States, a flight, and a hotel with a specific room type. They then recorded the total price of the package. In the no-choice condition, the participants' task was to browse through the website and find certain vacation destinations and hotels. To ensure participants in the latter condition spent about the same amount of time and effort on the task as the rest of the participants, we asked them to search for the destinations within the United States with the longest/shortest name and the hotels in that destination with the Choice and Instrumentality 10 longest/shortest name. This task was piloted to require a similar amount of time as building a vacation package, without involving choices. We recorded the total time spent completing the task in each condition.
In order to measure post-choice mental resources, we had participants move to another, supposedly unrelated "cognitive exercise study," which comprised a "vowel-hunting task" (adopted from Baumeister et al. 1998 , study 4; Moller et al. 2006, study 3) . In this task, participants crossed out each letter "e" in two pages of text unless doing so violated one of three rules: (a) the "e" is adjacent to another vowel, (b) the "e" is the first letter of a word, and (c) the "e" is followed by two consonants in the same word. To do well on this task, participants had to override the impulse to simply cross off every letter "e," which required mental resources.
Finally, in order to measure participants' interest in executing their vacation choices, we gave a follow-up survey to those who made choices as part of the "first experiment." The survey first reminded them of the trip they had selected and then instructed them to indicate the extent to which (a) they wanted to take the trip and (b) they wanted to take it as soon as possible (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).
Results and Discussion
The average prices of the selected vacation packages were not significantly different between the experiential (M = $2,180.24; SD = 1,568.11) and instrumental choice conditions (M = $2,221.18; SD = 1,343.15; t < 1), which suggests experiential choices were no less within reach (e.g., fantasizes and dreams) than instrumental choices.
Mental Resource. We used performance on the vowel-hunting task as a proxy for available mental resources. We calculated performance scores by subtracting the number of Choice and Instrumentality 11 "false alarms" (incorrectly crossing out unqualified "e"s) from the number of "hits" (correctly crossing out qualified "e"s; Moller et al. 2006) . In this calculation, the number of hits includes information on misses (failing to cross out qualified "e"s) because the two numbers sum up to the total of qualified "e"s. The number of false alarms includes information on correct rejections (not crossing out unqualified "e"s) because the two numbers sum up to the total of nonqualified "e"s. Misses and false alarms (or, hits and correct rejections) were positively correlated, r = .38, Interest in the Selected Option. We predict that an experiential choice increases interest in the selected products more than an instrumental choice does. We first collapsed the two items measuring interest in going on the selected vacation trip into a composite score (r(32) = .70, p < .001). In support of the hypothesis, analysis of this score revealed participants who made an Choice and Instrumentality 12 experiential choice were more interested in executing their vacation choice (M = 3.79, SD = 1.06) than those making an instrumental choice (M = 2.83, SD = .96; t(30) = 2.67, p = .01).
Ironically, reminding participants of an external reason to plan for an upcoming vacation decreased their interest in going on a selected vacation, compared with not having a particular goal in mind. We attribute this effect to the transfer of positive experience from the choice process to the selected items.
Study 1 finds initial evidence for the effect of experiential choice on increasing mental resources and interest in the selected item. Our results from the control, no-choice condition differed significantly from those from experiential choice but were similar to those from instrumental choice-a pattern supporting the energizing effect of choice more than a parallel effect of the depletion of mental resources. One possible reason we did not find a depleting effect is that participants made few choices, whereas depletion occurs usually after a sequence of many choices Vohs et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2010) . To test this possibility, in our next study, we manipulated the number of choices participants made. We predicted the energizing effect of choice emerges after a single experiential choice (as in the present study), whereas the depleting effect of choice only emerges after a series of instrumental choices. Study 2 further addresses a possible limitation of the current design, which is that participants did not expect to receive the selected option as part of the experiment. Although we used choice sets that are available for purchase (a common paradigm in the choice literature, e.g., Chernev 2003; Dhar 1997; Iyengar and Lepper 2000) , we did not follow up to record whether participants actually went on a similar vacation trip. Accordingly, in our next study, participants made a choice with the expectation of receiving their selected product as part of the experiment.
Choice and Instrumentality 13 STUDY 2: ONE VERSUS A SERIES OF CHOICES Participants in study 2 made a series of either experiential or instrumental choices across seven unrelated categories (e.g., coffee, books, magazines, and music CDs). We assessed their level of mental resources and interest in the selected product after their first and last choice. We predict the energizing effect of experiential choices will emerge after the first choice, whereas the depleting effect of instrumental choices will build up over a sequence of choices.
Specifically, participants in the experiential-choice conditions chose the product they liked most, whereas those in the instrumental-choice conditions chose the product they would have liked to buy most. A choice made for the sake of expressing one's taste is experiential, because the goal of choosing and the act of choosing occur simultaneously. In contrast, an external purchase goal renders the choice instrumental, because it serves a subsequent purchase.
We compared these choice modes to another no-choice condition, in which participants evaluated each option without choosing. In order to emphasize the choices had real consequences, we informed participants that some of them would be selected to receive their products of choice.
Method
We recruited 75 students (37 females) from a large Midwestern university to participate in this study for monetary compensation. This study employed a 3 (experiential choice vs. no choice vs. instrumental choice) × 2 (one vs. several choices) mixed design with the number of choices as a within-subjects factor.
Participants completed a "products survey" in which they made choices within seven different product categories: coffee blends, novels, music CDs, video games, magazines, DVD titles, and calendar designs. Within each category, the choice set included 10 alternatives, each Choice and Instrumentality 14 followed by a short description. For example, in the coffee category, participants read about products such as "Breakfast Blend: bright, sweet, rich taste and medium acidity," "Hazelnut:
buttery, sweet and creamy with the warm flavors of roasted nuts," and so on. Although we did not display prices, the alternatives within each set were similarly priced and had a similar quality.
They varied by subjective features such as flavors and tastes. We fixed the order of the categories and alternatives across conditions. Participants in the experiential-choice condition read their task was to choose the one item they liked most within each category. Participants in the instrumental-choice condition read their task was to choose the item they would most like to buy within each category. These instructions either focused participants on expressing their taste (in the experiential condition) or attending an external purchase goal (in the instrumental condition). Participants further read that they would be entering a lottery to receive their products of choice. Participants in the no-choice condition rated their liking of each option (1 = I do not like it at all; 7 = I like it very much). This no-choice condition required a similar amount of processing time as the two choice conditions. After completing the first (coffee blends) and last (calendar designs) categories, participants in the two choice conditions rated the degree to which they were interested in getting the selected product (1 = not at all; 9 = very much). This item was followed by a brief scale of post-choice mental resources, adopted from Thayer's (1987) subjective energy scale, which participants in all three conditions completed. Specifically, participants rated how they felt at that very moment (1 = tired; 9 = energized). A similar measure is commonly used to assess subjective vitality (Nix et al. 1999; Ryan and Frederick 1997) and it assesses people's general energy level beyond their motivation to perform any specific task. After the experiment was over, we randomly selected five participants to receive their products of choice.
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Results and Discussion
Mental Resource. Two participants failed to follow the instruction to choose only one item within each category and we removed them from further analysis. A 3 (experiential choice vs. no choice vs. instrumental choice) × 2 (one vs. several choices) ANOVA of subjective mental resources revealed the predicted interaction (F(2,70) = 3.30, p < .05; figure 2 ). Specifically, after one choice, we obtained a pattern similar to that in study 1 (F(2,70) These results support our hypothesis that the effect of choice on mental resources depends on the choice mode. They further suggest distinct patterns exist for energizing versus depleting effects.
The energizing effect of experiential choices emerges after a single choice, whereas the depleting effect of instrumental choices builds up over a sequence of choices.
An alternative way to analyze the data refers to the effect of one versus several choices within each choice mode. We find participants in the no-choice condition were no more energized after reviewing several sets than after reviewing one set (t < 1). Those in the experiential-choice condition felt marginally more energized after making several choices than Choice and Instrumentality 16 after making one choice (t(23) = 1.57, p = .10), and those in the instrumental-choice condition felt more depleted after making several choices than after making one choice (t(23) = 2.62, p < .05). This finding suggests making many experiential choices strengthens the energizing effect and making many instrumental choices brings about a depleting effect. 
Interest in the Selected
2.03).
Consistent with study 1, reminding participants of an external reason to choose (i.e., purchase) decreased their interest in the selected items. Possibly, participants in the liking (vs. purchasing) condition expressed lower interest in the items than those in the purchase condition because they experienced their choice as somehow incomplete. However, we believe this latter possibility is less likely because in none of the conditions did participants actually complete a purchase, and thus those in the purchasing condition were also unable to complete their choice.
We conducted a series of regressions to test whether the experience of subjective mental resources mediated the effect of choice mode on interest in the selected items. We first collapsed the ratings of interest in first and last items. We then found that experiential (vs. instrumental) choice mode directly increased participants' interest in getting the selected items (β = .24; t(47) = Choice and Instrumentality 17 2.13, p < .05). In addition, experiential (vs. instrumental) choice mode increased participants' self-reported mental resources (β = .42; t(47) = 3.93, p < .001), which in turn increased their interest in getting the selected items (β = .42; t(47) = 3.60, p = .001). When controlling for mental resources, the path between the choice mode and interest in getting the items became nonsignificant (β = .07; t < 1). The Sobel test statistic indicated the reduction of the choice mode effect was significant (z = 2.66, p < .01). We conclude that the experiential (vs. instrumental) choice mode increased mental resources, thereby increasing interest in getting the selected option.
So far, our studies explore the consequences of choosing versus not. A related question concerns the consequences of choosing versus not getting an opportunity to choose. Consumers do not get an opportunity to choose, for example, when they prepare to select a favorite food flavor or brand and then discover only one flavor or brand is available at the local grocer. As a result, the consumer may either feel she has been denied the opportunity to express her taste or that she is free from the chore of having to choose, depending on the mode of choice. We predict that when people expect to make an experiential choice, choosing will increase mental resources compared with not getting the opportunity to choose; however, when people expect to make an instrumental choice, choosing will decrease mental resources compared with not getting the opportunity to choose. Accordingly, in our next studies, we move to a new paradigm by first framing a certain choice as experiential versus instrumental and then comparing mental resources between those who get to make a choice and those who do not. We expect this paradigm will yield our effects already after making a single choice.
STUDY 3: CHOOSING A NOVEL
Strolling along the virtual bookshelf and choosing one's favorite novel can be a Choice and Instrumentality 18 pleasurable activity boosting mental resources or a chore depleting these resources, and the direction of the effect can depend on the choice mode. Accordingly, participants in study 3 considered choosing a novel. We framed the choice as experiential or instrumental before giving them an opportunity to actually choose or not. We expect choosers to feel more energized than non-choosers if their choice was experiential, but choosers (vs. non-choosers) should feel less energized if their choice was instrumental.
To manipulate choice mode, we built on research on goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al. 2002) , which asserts that an action is its own goal when a person considers the means to it and the action is a means when a person considers the goals it can serve. We therefore manipulated the choice mode by asking participants to list how versus why they choose books. In line with previous research (Freitas, Gollwitzer, and Trope 2004; Vallacher and Wegner 1987) , we assume that to answer the "how" question, people need to consider the means to choosing (e.g., check online books), which frames choice as the goal and therefore as experiential. Alternatively, to answer the "why" question, people need to consider what goal choosing serves (e.g., getting educated), which frames choice as a means and therefore as instrumental.
We predict that asking how (experiential choice) will increase mental resources among choosers (vs. non-choosers), but asking why (instrumental choice) will reduce mental resources among choosers (vs. non-choosers), as indicated by participants' motivation to engage in effortful activities afterward. We also predict that those who consider how (vs. why) they choose will have higher interest in getting the chosen book.
Method
We recruited 76 students (49 females) from a large Midwestern campus to participate in Choice and Instrumentality 19 this study for monetary compensation. This study employed 2 (experiential choice vs. instrumental choice) × 2 (choosers vs. non-choosers) between-subjects design.
The first experimental task manipulated choice mode. Participants in the experientialchoice condition completed a diagram directing their attention to how they choose a book. We asked them to consider the activity of "choosing a book" and to break this activity down into three levels. For example, one participant listed that he might choose a book by looking for the inside-cover descriptions, which he could obtain by looking in the back of the book, which he could obtain while walking around a bookstore. The participants in the instrumental-choice condition completed a similar diagram, although it directed their attention to why they choose a book. We asked them to trace the causes of their behavior back to broad life goals and delineate three levels up. For example, one participant listed that she might choose a book because she wants to read good literature on an interesting subject, which is because she wants to learn more about this topic, which is, in turn, because she wants to be smarter.
Participants then moved to a second task in which they read a list of hardcover fiction featuring 15 books (e.g., Child 44, The Appeal, The Whole Truth, Phantom Prey). We adapted this list from the New York Times Best Seller list for that week. For each book, we included the title, author, publisher, a brief synopsis, and a picture of the cover. The choosers read that their task was to review the list and choose one book they would like to read, whereas the nonchoosers read that their task was to review the list and rate how much they would like to read each book. Thus, everyone read all the information but only choosers made a choice. After making their choices, participants rated how much they wanted to get the selected book (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) and how soon they wanted to get it (1 = does not matter; 7 = very soon).
They also indicated how much they would be willing to pay for the selected book as a measure Choice and Instrumentality 20 of consumption intention (Carmon and Ariely 2000; Knetsch and Sinden 1984) . Non-choosers did not complete these choice items, because they did not select a book.
To measure mental resources, upon completion of the book choice or evaluation task, participants completed a supposedly unrelated "after-school survey" assessing their motivation to engage in three activities, of which one was taxing (studying) and two were relaxing (watching TV and getting rest). To the extent that making a choice increases mental resources, participants should have been more motivated to engage in taxing activities. To explore whether choice affects the motivation to engage in taxing activities, but not the perception of these activities as taxing, participants rated their behavioral intentions twice: specifically on that day, and in general (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). Today's behavioral intentions reflect available mental resources, whereas general behavioral intentions more likely reflect the perception of the activities as taxing.
Results and Discussion
Mental Resource. We reverse coded the two relaxing activities (watching TV and getting rest) and collapsed the three measures of behavioral intentions into a composite of motivation to pursue taxing activities in general (α = .67) and today (α = .71). An ANOVA of this index revealed the predicted 2 (experiential vs. instrumental choice) × 2 (choosers vs. non-choosers) × 2 (motivation today vs. in general) three-way interaction (F(1,72) = 8.11, p < .01; figure 3) . None of the two-way interactions and main effects were significant (Fs < 1).
To explore the sources of the 3-way interaction, we conducted separate ANOVAs in the today versus general conditions. We found no effect on intention to pursue taxing activities in general (F < 1; means are displayed in figure 3 ) and a 2 (experiential vs. instrumental choice) × 2 Choice and Instrumentality 21 (choosers vs. non-choosers) interaction for motivation to pursue these activities today (F(1,72) = 8.83, p < .01). Specifically, in the experiential-choice condition ("how"), choosers expressed greater intention (M = 4.35, SD = 1.48) than non-choosers (M = 3.32, SD = 1.65; t(36) = 2.03, p < .05) to pursue taxing activities today. In contrast, in the instrumental-choice condition ("why"), choosers expressed lesser intention (M = 3.21, SD = 1.33) than non-choosers (M = 4.32, SD = 1.80; t(36) = 2.17, p < .05) to pursue taxing activities today.
We found that although all participants considered choosing a novel, those who focused on the means of choosing (experiential choice) felt more energized if they got to make a choice (vs. not). In contrast, those who focused on the goal of choosing (instrumental choice) felt less energized if they got to make a choice (vs. not). We document these effects on mental resources by asking participants to rate their interest in pursuing everyday activities that were not part of the experiment (e.g., studying); therefore, any effect on depletion or energization would be hard to attribute to resource-management considerations, that is, participants' desire to monitor the total amount of effort invested in the experimental session. We further find that these effects exist only for activities that are scheduled for the present, suggesting the choice mode and choice opportunity manipulations did not affect the perceived effort in pursuing these activities, but rather the intention to pursue them right now, which indicates subjective energy.
Interestingly, we also find that choosers expressed greater intention to pursue taxing activities in the present when their choice was experiential (t(36) = 2.50, p < .05). However, nonchoosers were marginally more likely to pursue taxing activities in the present if they could not make an instrumental versus an experiential choice (t(36) = 1.80, p = .08). This pattern suggests that releasing a person from having to make an instrumental (vs. experiential) choice can also increase the motivation to invest resources somewhere else, in other taxing activities.
Choice and Instrumentality 22
Interest in the Selected Option. The choosers indicated their interest in the selected book.
We first z-transformed the two scale items of interest in the selected books and the willingness to pay for the book (α = .86) into a composite score. Analysis of this score revealed that in support of our prediction, participants in the experiential-choice ("how") condition expressed more interest in getting the selected book (M = .35, SD = .85) than those in the instrumental-choice ("why") condition (M = -.38, SD = .77; t(34) = 2.71, p = .01).
Notably, our manipulation of choice mode in this study (how vs. why) possibly also influenced the level of construal (abstract vs. concrete, e.g., Freitas et al. 2004 ). However, differences in level of construal cannot account for the effect on mental resources. High-level construal (why) is associated with better self-regulation (Fujita et al. 2006) , which, if anything, is associated with greater mental resources, but we find an increase in mental resources among those in the experiential-choice condition (how). Thus we conclude the focus on the goals of choosing decreased mental resources. In our last study, we test for yet another operationalization of choice mode. Specifically, we examine whether hedonic versus utilitarian shopping involves experiential versus instrumental choice modes.
STUDY 4: CHOOSING FLOWERS
Shopping for a flower bouquet is at times a pleasant, refreshing experience, but at other times an unpleasant, taxing chore. In this study, we sought to influence the experience of a bouquet choice by framing choice as hedonic versus utilitarian (Babin et al. 1994; Botti and McGill 2010; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000) . Specifically, we asked choosers to consider either the reasons they may want to get flowers or the reasons they may need to get flowers. The "want" question characterizes hedonic purchases, which are optional, whereas the "need" Choice and Instrumentality 23 question characterizes utilitarian purchases, which are required to satisfy an external goal (Khan, Dhar, and Wertenbroch 2005) . We assume hedonic purchases are experiential whereas utilitarian purchases are instrumental, because framing a purchase decision as a "want" compared with a "need" undermines the focus on meeting some external goals.
We followed a similar design as in the previous study. Participants listed reasons for bouquet shopping (want vs. need) before getting an opportunity to choose flowers versus not. We predict that when the choice is experiential ("want"), getting the opportunity to choose (vs. not) will increase mental resources, which will increase interest in getting the selected flower bouquet.
In contrast, when the choice is instrumental ("need"), getting an opportunity to choose (vs. not) will decrease mental resources, which will decrease the interest in getting the bouquet.
Method
We recruited 89 students (42 females) from a large Midwestern university to participate in this study for monetary compensation. This study employed a 2 (experiential choice vs. instrumental choice) × 2 (choosers vs. non-choosers) between-subjects design. The experiment was conducted on computers.
Participants completed a study on "bouquet shopping." Depending on the experimental condition, the participants' first task was to list five reasons they might want to choose a flower bouquet versus reasons they might need to choose a flower bouquet. Examples for "wants" in the experiential-choice condition include "searching for flowers is fun" and "I want to see something beautiful." Examples for "needs" in the instrumental-choice condition include "I need a gift for my girlfriend" and "I need to give flowers to my friend on his birthday."
All participants then read about an online flower shop (flowershop.com). The choosers Choice and Instrumentality 24 read that their task was to browse through this online store in order to choose a flower bouquet, whereas the non-choosers read that their task was to browse the online store and find several bouquets. Specifically, the non-choosers had to find the most expensive flower in the birthday category and the cheapest flower in the new-baby category. Thus they processed a similar amount of information but did not make a choice. We recorded the total time spent on browsing and making the choices. Upon finishing the task, participants completed a measure of postchoice mental resources using the same scale as study 2 (1 = tired; 7 = energized) and also rated their general mood (1 = bad, unhappy; 7 = good, happy) . We expected the choice mode to have a unique impact on feelings of energy, which is distinct from general mood (also see Watson and Tellegen 1985) .
Finally, participants in the choice conditions completed a "post choice survey" measuring their interest in getting the selected bouquet. We asked them to consider their choices and rate (1) whether they wanted to purchase the bouquet they selected and (2) whether they would like to receive it as soon as possible (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).
Results and Discussion
The total time participants spent on browsing and choosing was similar across experimental conditions (F < 1), and the average price of the selected bouquet was similar between the two choice conditions (t < 1). energized than non-choosers (M = 4.27, SD = 1.04; t(42) = 2.14, p < .05). However, in the instrumental-choice ("need") condition, choosers (M = 4.07, SD = .87) felt less energized than non-choosers (M = 5.00, SD = .89; t(43) = 3.54, p < .001). An analysis of the general mood items (feeling good and happy) yielded no effect for experimental condition (Fs < 1), suggesting experiential choices bring about energization, which is distinct from general mood.
These results extend our findings from study 3, as choosing (vs. not) increases mental resources when the choice was experiential but decreases resources for instrumental choice. In addition, whereas choosers felt more energized when their choices were experiential (vs.
instrumental; t(43) = 3.10, p < .005), non-choosers felt more energized when they could not make instrumental (vs. experiential) choices (t(42) = 2.48, p < .05). Releasing a person from making an effortful choice appears to create an experience of energization.
Interest in the Selected Option. To investigate how the choice mode influences participants' subsequent interest in the selected product, we first collapsed the two measures that only choosers completed of their interest in getting the flower bouquets (r(45) = .71, p < .001).
Analysis of the composite score revealed that participants in the experiential-choice ("want") condition were more interested in getting the bouquets (M = 2.59, SD = 1.91) than those in the instrumental-choice ("need") condition (M = 1.83, SD = .72; t(43) = 2.62, p < .05). Thus experiential versus instrumental choice increases interest in the selected product. We attribute this effect to the transfer of positive experience of boosting mental resources to the selected product, and thus tested whether subjective mental resources mediated for choosers the effect of choice mode on interest in the selected product.
The mediation analysis revealed that experiential (vs. instrumental) choice mode directly increased participants' interest in getting the selected bouquets (β = .38; t(44) = 2.62, p < .05). In Choice and Instrumentality 26 addition, the experiential (vs. instrumental) choice mode increased participants' self-reported mental resources (β = .43; t(44) = 3.09, p < .005), which in turn increased their interest in getting their selected bouquets (β = .41; t(44) = 2.92, p < .01). When controlling for mental resources, the path between the choice mode and interest in getting the flower bouquets became nonsignificant (β = .25; t(44) = 1.60, p >.1). The Sobel test statistic indicated the reduction of the choice mode effect was marginally significant (z = 1.74, p = .08). We conclude that greater concern with the goal of choosing increases the subjective effort of making the choice, which subsequently diminishes interest in the selected product.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Not all choices are instrumental: some are experiential and are made to express preferences when individuals do not hold a salient consumption goal. We find that whereas instrumental choices decrease mental resources, experiential choices boost these resources. We observe this pattern across various operationalizations and choice contexts, including choosing among vacation packages, novels, bouquets, and so on. We further find this pattern across different measures of mental resources, including performance on cognitive tasks ), motivation to pursue effortful activities, and reports of subjective levels of energy (Thayer 1987) .
Specifically, in studies 1 and 2, we manipulated choice mode by either emphasizing or not emphasizing the goal of making a choice. In study 1, those choosing a vacation package for its own sake (experiential choice) did better on a subsequent difficult cognitive task than those choosing a vacation package in order to prepare for an upcoming vacation (instrumental choice).
In study 2, those choosing products they liked most (experiential choice) felt more energized Choice and Instrumentality 27 than those choosing products they would like to buy (instrumental choice). In studies 3 and 4, we compared choosers to non-choosers after introducing a choice context. In study 3, after considering the means of choosing a novel (experiential choice), those who made a choice (vs. not) expressed greater motivation to pursue effortful activities. But this effect reversed among those who first considered the goal of choosing a book (instrumental choice). In study 4, hedonic choice mode ("wants") increased mental resources among choosers (vs. non-choosers) of a bouquet, but instrumental choice mode ("needs") increased mental resources among nonchoosers (vs. choosers).
In our studies, we assessed the motivational component of mental resources, that is, participants' sustained willingness to exert effort and their subjective feelings of energy. We believe that exhibiting motivational resources often reflects individuals' physiological resources (i.e., their ability to exert effort); however, these are theoretically different variables. The extent to which a person is motivated to pursue effortful tasks reflects his motivational resources (which is further different than feeling motivated to pursue a specific important task). The extent to which a person is physically able to pursue effortful tasks reflects her physiological resources.
Across our studies, we further find consistent support that, compared with instrumental choices, experiential choices increase interest in the selected products. We attribute this pattern to the positive experience of restoring mental resources, which transfers into positive evaluation of the selected product, thereby increasing interest in it.
Implications for Choice Research
Choices are central to people's everyday lives, from choosing what to eat to choosing whom to marry. Research on the psychological consequences of choice find that choices are an expression of one's selfhood and lead to positive experiences (Deci and Ryan 1985; Savani et al. Choice and Instrumentality 28 2008; Stephens et al. 2007; Taylor 1989) but also that making choices is a difficult, depleting task Vohs et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2010 ) individuals often defer to avoid discomfort (Dhar 1997; Iyengar and Lepper 2000) . To explain this discrepancy, previous research explored the content of choice, showing, for example, that choosing from a positive set is more enjoyable than choosing from a negative set (Botti and Iyengar 2004; Botti and McGill 2006) . We explored the structure of choice while holding the choice content similar. We find that a choice among positive-valence options (e.g., vacation packages, flowers) can be experienced as increasing or decreasing resources, depending on whether choice is experiential or instrumental.
We argue that although experiential choices are typically made from a positive set and result in enjoyment, enjoyment is not the goal of the experiential choice. That is, because enjoyment is not conditional on receiving the selected product (as in instrumental choice), but rather, on the act of choosing, we can regard the act of choosing as the end state that (like any other end state) is characterized by positive feelings. Notably, because participants in our studies always made choices from a positive set, one could argue they derived positive value from savoring, that is, from envisioning potential positive experiences. Savoring occurs, for example, when choosers envision themselves going on their selected trip (Loewenstein 1987) . Similarly, participants might have derived value from fantasizing about the positive aspects of a desired future (Oettingen and Mayer 2002) . We believe choices that involve savoring or fantasizing are often experiential. However, because we held the content of the options constant across the choice modes, these possible positive outcomes from imagined future states cannot account for our results. In our studies, choices from the same positive set had distinct consequences.
A related alternative is that hypothetical choices such as a movie star for a kiss (Loewenstein 1987 ), which we assumed are experiential, are instrumental for enjoying the Choice and Instrumentality 29 fantasy. If so, we should expect fantasizing on the outcome of a choice to have even greater impact on mental resources than choosing per se. To test for this alternative, we conducted a follow-up study in which we asked participants to choose a movie star from whom they would like to get a kiss and rate their subjective energy immediately after choosing and after fantasizing receiving the kiss. Participants (15 females and 12 males from a South Korean University) chose a movie star from a list of 15 Korean movie stars of the opposite sex. They rated their subjective resources (1 = tired; 7 = energized) before and after taking a couple of minutes to imagine the kiss. We found that the act of choosing made participants more (M = 5.66; SD = 1.26) energized than fantasizing (M = 5.10; SD = 1.46; t(26) = 2.67, p = .01). We found no effect for gender. We take it as evidence that experiential (e.g., hypothetical) choices are energizing because they are their own end and not because they serve another end, such as having a fantasy.
Our results have further implications for research on the relationships between mood, mental resources, and choice overload. Existing research postulates that positive mood increases ego resources (Tice et al. 2007 ) and decreases the negative impact of choice overload (Isen and Spassova 2009) . It is thus possible that positive mood engenders perception of choices as more experiential. In addition, our results have implications for research on the size of a choice set.
Whereas previous research found that the size of a choice set decreases choice satisfaction (e.g., Iyengar and Lepper 2000) , having more options can have quite the opposite impact when the choice is experiential. Future research will explore these possibilities.
Implications for Marketers
These findings have important implications for marketers who wish to understand consumer choice. Recent goal research identifies the conditions under which a salient goal can ironically decrease motivation (Ordonez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, and Bazerman 2009) . We find Choice and Instrumentality 30 parallels with choice. In particular, by deemphasizing the need for a product, marketers can increase interest in that product. This assertion does not imply consumers are less likely to act on their choices as the objective need for a product increases. On the contrary, consumers are more likely to buy a product if they presently need it. For example, consumers are more likely to get an umbrella when it is rainy than when it is sunny. However, given a similar level of need (e.g., it is rainy), marketers that deemphasize the need to act on choice create a more pleasant experience, which is likely to increase interest in the selected product (e.g., buying an umbrella).
Finally, one should keep in mind that consumers will act on their choices only to the extent that they have made these choices in the first place. Deemphasizing the goal of choosing would not be effective if, as a result, the consumer is less likely to choose. Encouraging consumers to make choices for the sake of expressing their tastes is therefore an effective strategy. Marketers should realize that giving consumers the opportunity to make such choices without the pressure of acting on them ends up increasing the intention to act on those choices.
